The twilight of the post-December historical cycle

Article by Florin Abraham

The main trends in Romanian society in 2025 converge towards the conclusion that this is the first year of a short transition period at the end of a four-decade historical cycle. The historical period following the December 1989 Revolution was characterized by the dominance of a single political actor (the Social Democratic Party – PSD), with its various institutional and ideological metamorphoses, which ensured the stability of the political regime and Euro-Atlantic consensus. This historical cycle is very likely to end with the elections between 2028 and 2030. The PSD will no longer be able to form a government around itself, although it may be co-opted into new coalitions, and the Social Democratic candidate will only be able to reach the final round of the presidential elections if both the candidate and the political context are exceptional, rather than through the mobilising force of traditional party organisations. 

The dilution of the political center's relevance opens up the prospect of a prolonged period of instability, marked by political rivalries along a new dominant divide. This is part of an international cultural-ideological confrontation between supporters of a pluralistic, progress-oriented, and environmentally sensitive society and promoters of a "sieve society"—a model that is not fully closed or totalitarian, but which operates through extremely restrictive criteria of inclusion. In the latter, racial minorities and LGBTQIA communities are rejected, and cultural conservatism and scepticism towards environmental policies tend to combine with political authoritarianism and expectations of continued state paternalism.

Political and security context

The main themes for 2025 were based on four topics. The first one was Romania's relationship with the Trump administration, given the ideological disconnect between the government in Bucharest and the Republican Party, in a general context of tension between the European Union and the United States. The second concern was related to the dynamics of the war in Ukraine, with all its geopolitical, economic, and psychological consequences. The theme of macroeconomic imbalances (budget deficit, trade deficit, and inflation) reshaped the government's political agenda, with the process of political acceptance of economic reality and political responsibility for it being difficult and dominated by conflict. Finally, the shockwave caused by the cancellation of the presidential elections at the end of 2024 only subsided after the presidential elections were won by a politician who did not question the Euro-Atlantic consensus.

The result was a political year structured around three seasons. Until the end of May, the dominant theme was the presidential elections, followed by the formation of Ilie Bolojan's government and its attempt to take the political initiative within the governing coalition. From September onwards, the apparent harmony within the governing coalition was shattered by the Social Democratic Party, which became increasingly virulent towards Prime Minister Bolojan, publicly contesting his decisions and delaying projects introducing austerity policies. The PSD has publicly assumed, through some of its leaders, the role of opposition within the governing coalition. 

The conflictual polycentrism of the governing coalition

The illusion of a long-term centrist coalition in government, fueled by the then leaders of the PSD and the National Liberal Party (PNL), Marcel Ciolacu and Nicolae Ciucă, was shattered by the electorate in the parliamentary and presidential elections at the end of 2024. Following the presidential elections in May 2025, a polycentric government coalition was formed— —PSD, PNL, Save Romania Union (USR), Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR), National Minorities Group—which contains the seeds of multiple and repetitive conflicts. 

The first axis of conflict naturally brings the PSD and the Save Romania Union (USR) face to face. The latter was formed as an anti-system political party, a system that it has identified in its recent coalition partner. Although, strictly mathematically, the government coalition has the necessary number of votes in Parliament to have a majority even without the USR, it cannot function without the political party led by Dominic Fritz because the Union has the functions of a presidential party. Keeping the USR in government reduces the risk of a harsh cohabitation between Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan and President Nicușor Dan, even at the cost of increasing tensions with the PSD. 

The second source of political conflict is the PSD's desire to become the dominant player in the governing coalition, hoping, under the threat of the government's collapse, to remove Ilie Bolojan from the head of the Cabinet. However, the pressure exerted by PSD leaders on Ilie Bolojan is not supported by the other parties in the governing coalition, nor by President Dan. The main political leaders are aware that Ilie Bolojan, with his promises to reform the public system, is a guarantee that relations with the European Commission and international financiers will not be completely frozen, as long as the government follows a path of correcting macroeconomic imbalances.

The rivalries between the parties in the governing coalition also reveal ideological divisions. The USR and PNL support the idea of a minimal state, privatization, and the liquidation of inefficient companies, while the PSD maintains the idea of an interventionist state involved in the economy. Without significantly affecting the ruling coalition's agenda, the divide between the progressive-cosmopolitan (USR) and conservative-nationalist (PSD) cultural orientations is evident. 

Political conflicts within large governing coalitions can be seen as proof of the vitality of democracy, but political history shows that the electorate is not sensitive to nuances and justifications, punishing all participants in repeated scandals. This is what happened in 2000, when the PNȚCD, the main governing party after 1996, failed to enter Parliament, and the other parties managed to mobilize only their core voters. If there is a lesson to be learned, it is the need for solidarity and loyal cooperation between the parties in a coalition, especially in times of economic and social crisis. 

A president with an insufficiently defined role and pace

Nicușor Dan's implicit promise that he would not be a traditional president and his refusal to engage in theatricality in his political performance brought him success among an electorate that felt the need for a historic correction in presidential style. Nicușor Dan's calculated simplicity created a stark contrast to Klaus Iohannis' ostentatious display of power privileges, earning the former the support of a broad spectrum of political orientations in the May 2025 presidential election. 

The team of advisors to the Presidential Administration was formed slowly but grew in number, being built on the criterion of personal and ideological compatibility with the holder of the presidential office. The dismissal (in November 2025) of Ludovic Orban from the position of presidential advisor for domestic policy is not just a simple gesture of affirming President Dan's authority over his team, but a rejection of the political rhetoric that accompanies the concept of the "player-president." By refusing to publicly affirm the presidential voluntarism specific to the "player-president," Nicușor Dan seems to be experimenting with the "technician-president" model. It is a political strategy with both advantages and risks. It reduces the pressure and expectations related to the direct results of the President of the Republic, who is, in terms of image, the country's first servant, not its first dignitary. He can retain that electorate that sees the head of state as a less partisan figure. At the same time, the technocratisation of political power can be perceived as inaction or political weakness in a political culture where vitality and theatricality have been the real driving forces until now.

Nicușor Dan's main political effort has been directed towards maintaining the stability of the governing coalition, both for reasons of state and for political reasons. The public friendship shown by President Dan to the Social Democrats is the result of a realistic political calculation: lacking the constitutional tools to oppose a hypothetical PSD-AUR alliance, he is forced to irritate his most radical supporters who would like to see the political marginalization of the left. By openly supporting, to the limits of the Constitution, the candidate Cătălin Drulă for the Bucharest City Hall, he sought to satisfy this category of supporters, but the failure of the USR leader shows that President Dan cannot significantly transfer the sympathy of his electorate to other politicians.

In the area traditionally considered the prerogative of the President of the Republic, that of the State's international policy, there was a noticeable tension between the obligation to follow a realistic line of defense of national interests by building a functional relationship with the Trump Administration, on the one hand, and the pro-Europeanism of the presidential advisers with responsibilities in this area, on the other. The agenda of concrete activities at the international level is overshadowed by timidity, in stark contrast to the regional dynamism of Poland and Hungary. President Dan participated in multilateral diplomatic activities, which are mandatory by virtue of NATO and EU membership, and Foreign Minister Oana Țoiu, who completes the circle of presidential control over foreign relations at the state level, has not broken out of the paradigm of inertial passivity that also characterized the Iohannis administration.

The opposition, waiting for the "explosion of the polenta"

The direct consequence of the state of deep social discontent and hostility towards traditional parties is the electorate's adherence to the AUR party. The depth of social discontent is also revealed by the fact that, although George Simion lost the presidential election, the AUR did not experience an electoral decline. On the contrary, opinion polls credit it as the leading party in all segments up to the age of 60. 

Although it defines itself as a "total anti-system" force, the AUR does not practice opposition oriented towards formulating public policy alternatives, but has a strategy based on political attacks, virulent rhetoric, and a discursive arsenal marked by conspiracy myths and disinformation. The party's dominance in the digital space allows it to quickly transform social frustration into political capital. This was highlighted by the results of the Bucharest election (December 7), with candidate Anca Alexandrescu coming in second. 

Given that the process of macroeconomic consolidation will take several years, the inherent social tensions will fuel a massive protest vote. Although traditional parties, the media, and opinion makers insist on the extremist nature of the AUR, including its convergence with the pro-Kremlin rhetoric used by other Eurosceptic European parties, this has so far had no effect on the party's political popularity. Moreover, these accusations are countered by the AUR with the argument that they demonstrate the party's   genuine anti-establishment orientation.   

PSD, in pursuit of AUR

The PSD's failures in the 2024-2025 presidential elections were interpreted by most social democrats as temporary defeats, not signs of a systemic crisis. Therefore, after Marcel Ciolacu's resignation from the leadership of the PSD, a transition was negotiated within the same team, with former first vice-president Sorin Grindeanu being elected party president at a congress where only one motion was presented. The manner of power transfer within the PSD reveals the main operational premises for the coming years. Firstly, we note the attempt to recover the electorate lost to the AUR through a transactional-limited approach to participation in the government coalition, namely by blocking or watering down the austerity policies of the Bolojan Cabinet. Secondly, the national leadership of the PSD has adopted the vision of its mayors and local elected officials, with the aim of approaching the 2028 local and parliamentary elections as the party in power and hoping that directing financial resources towards its own electoral strongholds will be a winning strategy. 

The crisis of social democracy is not determined exclusively by factors external to the PSD. A recurring reason for the loss of appeal in urban areas is the party's human resources policy. Over the last decade, the criterion of "political recommendation" from local organizations has gradually replaced promotion based on political and professional competence. Clientelism has massively eroded the party's image of competence, on which the PSD built its strength in the first two decades after 1989. The PSD leadership faces a structural dilemma: reactivating the policy of selecting elites, in the sense of meritocratic promotion, or perpetuating a model dominated by informal loyalties and clientelistic dependencies. Reducing clientelism would almost inevitably generate resistance from local organizations. On the other hand, maintaining the current model risks accelerating the party's electoral decline in large urban centers.

The attempt to win back voters lost to anti-establishment parties is symbolically marked by the removal from the PSD Statute of the phrase "a modern and progressive left-wing party, a national party with a European vocation" and its replacement with "a modern, center-left party, promoter of social equity and solidarity, attached to the democratic, national, religious, traditional, and cultural values of the Romanian people". Undoubtedly, the change in the PSD's axiological self-definition places it outside the ideological core of the European left (progressivism), but brings it much closer to the real values of its predominantly conservative electoral core. The affirmation of Romanian-style social democracy will be a test not so much in terms of its relationship with the Western European left, which is itself doctrinally polymorphic, but in terms of its electoral appeal in conditions of socio-economic crisis.   

Consolidation of the contractionary tendencies of the political center

The erosion of the political center, represented by the PSD-PNL tandem, is favored by the social crisis, which amplifies social anxiety. The undermining of political approaches based on the responsibility of government is facilitated by the growing role of digital platforms. Their algorithms encourage the polarisation of political options, so that less emotionally charged, more nuanced messages are structurally disadvantaged by the logic of the hybrid media system. The traditional press, which can be more easily co-opted to support nuanced political messages, fails to compete with digital platforms, as evidenced by the results of the 2024-2025 elections. The "information bubbles" in which some voters live favor the polarization of political options and the radicalization of society. 

The liquefaction of the traditional left-right divide, through the standardization of the political values and practices of the PSD and PNL, is a third factor explaining the emergence of a new type of electorate, with political values and expectations different from those offered by traditional parties. While part of the electorate finds these expectations in the AUR Party, the lack of a strong modern left-wing message leaves room for the emergence of new parties to catalyse this fragmented electorate, which is not represented by the PSD.   

The PSD's failure in the Bucharest elections (December 7, 2025) and its success in small communities or less economically developed areas (e.g., Buzău) reinforce the trend mentioned above: the lack of appeal of the Social Democrats in large cities and the restriction of their electorate to rural areas and small towns. 

Outlook

The socio-economic crisis, fueled by the sharp increase in public debt servicing, compounded by the geopolitical consequences of the war in Ukraine, are the main factors that may maintain a tense political climate in 2026. The freezing of public sector wages and pensions, against a backdrop of high inflation and expected energy price increases, will also have negative effects on the private economy, which will be forced to absorb the shock of falling domestic and European demand. This combination will give rise to social anxiety and anarchic tendencies. The announced layoffs in the public sector and the rapid decline in purchasing power may trigger union action. The pre-university education system risks repeating the 2023 strike scenario, but in a more radical form.

Our hypothesis is that, given the regional geopolitical instability, political actors will prefer limited conflicts, geared towards electoral positioning, to large-scale confrontations that could lead to the collapse of the governing coalition. The coalition will continue to function, even if the replacement of Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan or a series of reshuffles aimed at defusing political tensions cannot be ruled out.

For the PSD, the fall of 2026 represents the last strategic window for withdrawing from government in order to reconsolidate from the opposition ahead of the 2028 elections. After that, the party will have to assume the role of "adult of the coalition", preparing the ground for a government it could lead from spring 2027, when the PNL and USR will tend to adopt a strategy of opposition from within the ruling coalition.

AUR will try to consolidate its political capital by intensifying the radicalism of its public demonstrations, keeping its already loyal electorate mobilized. At the same time, the party is preparing for the prospect of governing, which is why George Simion is promoting the rise of a core group of technicians tasked with giving the party added professional credibility.

In this context, the role of President Nicușor Dan becomes decisive. He can either amplify the conflicting tendencies of the coalition parties or adopt a strategy of tempering tensions, remaining solidary with the major objectives of the government. His political success will depend on how he manages the consolidation of the USR as a presidential party. A "player-president" strategy will antagonize both the PNL and the PSD, while a cautious approach, maintaining the appearance of neutrality required by the Constitution, could preserve the already fragile cohesion of the coalition.

The year 2026 will also be decisive for the emergence of marginal political formations or new political vehicles for leaders seeking to reinvent themselves. The socio-economic crisis provides fertile ground for such initiatives, but their success remains uncertain.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES).

About the author:

Dr. Florin Abraham is a historian and professor of political science at SNSPA. His academic interests include 20th-century history, political systems, and democratization processes. He has published several books in Romania and abroad, as well as dozens of scientific articles.