The far right in 2025: between combating and normalizing

Article by Adina Marincea

It has been over a year since Romania's Constitutional Court (CCR) rejected Diana Șoșoacă's candidacy and, in the name of militant democracy, annulled the results of the first round of the presidential elections won by Călin Georgescu. Both were considered threats to democracy, both because of suspicions of interference by the Kremlin regime and because of their far-right profiles. As a result, the issue of right-wing extremism gained visibility in the media and in the public sphere.

The year 2024 ended with a high-impact journalistic investigation that published photos of people gathered in Tâncăbești, with Legionary symbols and salutes, to commemorate the leader of the Legionary Movement, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. This was followed by an unprecedented mobilization, which continued throughout 2025, in parallel with preparations for the resumption of the presidential elections: self-referrals, indictments, convictions (albeit suspended), and the dusting off of complaints that had been ignored for years.

Despite a few signs of mobilization and growing awareness of the threat posed by the far right, towards the end of the year we see not only a relative return to the previous state of affairs — passivity and tacit cohabitation with the far right — but even an active normalization of it among some public institutions and democratic political elites who have capitalized politically on the rhetoric of combating anti-democratic forces. 

An unprecedented mobilization

In the tense electoral context of 2024, for the first time in 30 years, law enforcement agencies took action on their own initiative and opened criminal cases against several participants, including some organizers of the annual commemorations in Tâncăbești.

From the end of last year to the present, public authorities have ordered a record number of measures—searches, judicial control, indictments, and even a few convictions—for charges such as forming an organized criminal group and treason (the "Vlad Țepeș Command" case), performing the fascist salute in public, or promoting or distributing such symbols.

The National Audiovisual Council (CNA) has also taken a more active role in the online environment, issuing orders to remove several pieces of illegal content, often anti-Semitic and hateful, from various social networks. However, the capacity of a single institution to deal with illegal, far-right content flooding multiple online platforms is very limited—by available resources, procedural bureaucracy, and various technical details that can render the provisions of the DSA inoperable in practice.

These reasons may partly explain why a neo-Legionary online radio station or websites known to have systematically distributed material for years that clearly falls under the legal provisions aimed at combating hate speech, denialism, and the glorification of fascism and war criminals, remain active despite complaints and reports from journalists or public institutions (e.g., CNA, INSHR-EW).

In fact, at the end of 2024, the CNA announced that it had notified the National Cyber Security Directorate (DNSC) to investigate several websites that disseminate extremist ideologies, and in the fall of 2025, it notified the coordinator of digital services—the National Authority for Administration and Regulation in Communications (ANCOM)—and the Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (PÎCCJ) about the online radio station that promotes the Legionary Movement.

Two things emerge from this: on the one hand, the limited nature of the CNA's legal prerogatives, hence the need for other authorities to be involved in combating neo-fascist content, and, on the other hand, the passivity or slowness of these third institutions, which do not seem to find solutions to the problems reported, and sometimes do not even seem to have the motivation to do so. The result is the almost unchecked proliferation of far-right content, despite the DSA regulations in force.

Radicalization, threats, online and street violence

Călin Georgescu's campaign and his victory in the first round of the election seemed to give an unprecedented boost to far-right manifestations: verbal and even physical violence, death threats targeting journalists, teachers, activists, researchers, and various public figures. In a context where American businessmen and advisers Elon Musk and Steve Bannon were giving the fascist salute in public, Georgescu also displayed the legionary salute on the steps of the General Prosecutor's Office, where he was being questioned for forming a fascist organization and promoting the cult of war criminals. Towards the end of the year, he called politicians and government officials "lice and rats." His supporters were even more explicitly violent, intimidating and verbally and physically assaulting several journalists during two protests called in January by AUR and Călin Georgescu against the cancellation of the elections.

However, the relative mobilization of the authorities, together with press investigations, had the effect of discouraging some of the far-right protesters of recent years, leading to the dismantling of some groups, or at least their move to online spaces less accessible to the public. On the other hand, new far-right, neo-Legionary, or neo-Nazi groups and online channels continued to emerge, organized mainly by young people, with radicalization becoming more visible on the streets, including through attacks on immigrant delivery workers.

One such attack motivated by racist and xenophobic hatred took place in August against a courier from Bangladesh. The attacker, who filmed the attack, is also being investigated for promoting Legionary and Nazi symbols. The attack came in a context where hatred towards immigrants was being fuelled from several sides: the vice-president of AUR was publicly inciting the public to refuse orders that were not delivered by Romanians, and the New Right (ND) had received approval from the Bucharest City Hall (PMB) to organize a white supremacist protest that explicitly incited hatred against immigrants and people of color, "non-Europeans."

Both the ND and other far-right groups had vocally expressed their opposition to the "Strategy for the Inclusion of Migrants in Bucharest." Among them was Mihai Rapcea, former lawyer for Diana Șoșoacă, former member of ND and SOS, and candidate in the 2024 parliamentary elections on the lists of another extremist party: PPR. As vice president of the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Stateless Persons and Refugees (APADAR), Rapcea submitted a memorandum to the Bucharest City Council in July in which he applied the classic theses of the Western nativist right to the Romanian context, accusing the state of alleged discrimination against Romanians through the support offered to economic migrants and associating migrants, especially non-Europeans, with crime.

The 2025 campaign and the normalization of the radical right

The polarizing, conspiratorial, and hate-inciting discourse continued in the campaign for the 2025 presidential election rerun. As in 2024, the election campaign was marked by conservative rhetoric with nationalist overtones, in which messages about "gender ideology" and the LGBT community or, less frequently, about immigrants, were used to create identity-based oppositions such as "them" (defined as "Sorosists," "neo-Marxists," "progressives," "globalists," "woke," or foreigners) and "us" (patriotic Romanians with traditional values). A study conducted by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Romania (FES) shows that not only did populist right-wing candidates rely on this strategy, but it was also taken up by other candidates, especially the joint candidate of the traditional PSD-PNL parties, who attempted to appropriate AUR themes such as "the traditional family."

The same report also shows that, in 2025, the election campaign normalized misogynistic and transphobic discourse among candidates, including those from traditional parties, with a relativization of abortion rights also prevailing among candidates.

This trend is not entirely new, but rather a continuation of the electoral strategies of the previous year. The signs were visible even earlier, with mainstream parties adopting the rhetoric of the populist "sovereignist" right, with Trumpist influences, as early as 2019, as we pointed out almost two years ago, when we warned that a radicalization of traditional parties was possible if they chose to adopt the populist nationalism of the AUR. We find such campaigns as early as 2014, in the PSD-UNPR-PC alliance led by Liviu Dragnea under the slogan "Proud to be Romanian!", accompanied by folkloric and traditionalist symbols.

What we see in 2025 is that this discourse is being adopted beyond traditional parties, by politicians perceived as "anti-system" of the democratic, pro-European alternative, such as the president-elect, Nicușor Dan, as well as by various public institutions, cultural elites, and even transnational companies, in an attempt to capitalize on nationalist discourse, even though it fundamentally opposes "foreign" capital. All these signals point to an accelerated mainstreaming[1] and normalization of radical right-wing populism, a revival of conservative nationalism reorganized in the form of so-called "sovereignism," which foreshadows the desired sociopolitical reality, in unison and without real, coherent, and sustained opposition at the level of political parties, to be fulfilled with the next election in 2028.

The cult and rehabilitation of Legionary ideologues and war criminals continued in 2025, with the contribution of various public and private institutions, especially in the cultural and artistic sphere, both national and local. Here are just a few examples: In the spring, the Panait Istrati County Library in Brăila organized exhibitions dedicated to the cult of Legionary ideologues Nae Ionescu^[2] and Ernest Bernea^[3]. More recently, an institute under the auspices of the Romanian Academy organized a tribute event that aimed to "rehabilitate" the fascist theologian Nichifor Crainic^[4], while the National Museum of Romanian Literature and a municipal library organized tribute exhibitions for the war criminal Vintilă Horia^[5]. Of course, in all these cases, the critical dimension is completely absent, with fascist ideologues being rehabilitated exclusively as exceptional writers or intellectuals.

Religious cults also contributed, as they do every year, to the rehabilitation of Legionary ideas and figures. Legionary commemorations continued, both inside and outside the country, with the participation of Orthodox and Greek Catholic priests who were consistent in their neo-Legionary activity, some of them close to ideologues and political leaders of the radical populist right in parliament.

The Romanian Orthodox Church went further in 2025 with the decision to canonize the three priests close to the Legionary Movement or promoters of the interwar far right, despite criticism of the implications of this gesture.

Other institutions and even companies tried to capitalize on some of the nationalist fervor and traditionalist nostalgia, keeping their distance from Legionary extremism but promoting some of the cultural dimensions that fueled it. Especially around the national holiday of December 1, we saw an aesthetic appropriation of the ia, as a symbol of tradition and traditionalism, from museums to Romanian branches of Western stores.

Slips into anti-Semitic, negationist, and apologetic territory regarding Ion Antonescu and the Legionnaires became more frequent in 2025, even in the media—newspapers and television stations legitimizing far-right and revisionist ideas. Complementing the abundance of these messages online and in the radical right-wing press, they are having an effect. A recent poll shows that almost half of Romanians have come to believe anti-Semitic conspiracy theories such as "Jews want to rule the world" (47%), "Romania no longer exists as a state, it has been captured by Jews" (45%), or "Jews own 3 million apartments in Romania" (41%).

Policies and legislation

In 2025, one year after the investigations launched following the Legionary commemoration in Tâncăbești in 2024, law enforcement agencies ensured the smooth running of a new commemoration, investigating the destruction of the Legionary shrine—a fascist symbol banned by law—rather than the commemoration and placement of the new cross bearing the inscription "Corneliu Zelea Codreanu." A minor fact, but illustrative of the state's de facto attitude towards combating the far right, foreshadowing the alignment with the illiberal political priorities from East to West of condemning anti-fascism rather than the far right.

When part of the electorate seemed to breathe a sigh of relief after the election of the new president, considered a victory for European democracy over radical right-wing populism, a series of actions and statements by the president-elect cast doubt on his position on combating the far right. These include the decoration of retired colonel Ion Vasile Banu, part of the 89th Regiment, which contributed to the arrest and ghettoization of Jews in Bessarabia and Transnistria (INSHR-EW, 2025), as well as the insistent challenge to the law aimed at amending and supplementing OUG 31/2002. Among other things, the law is intended to facilitate the condemnation of Legionary organizations and materials. However, Nicușor Dan's initiative was unsuccessful—both the Constitutional Court and the Senate rejected the president's objections.

In September, the AUR submitted a legislative proposal that would allow the directors of state and private pre-university educational institutions to decide that school activities should begin with the singing of the national anthem and the "Our Father" prayer. The bill also stipulated that any refusal to participate had to be submitted in writing to the principal, which was one of the reasons cited by the Economic and Social Council for giving a negative opinion, arguing that the provisions of the proposal could create stigmatization and discrimination, deepening cultural and religious divisions.

Also in the field of education, the new Romanian language and literature curriculum for ninth grade, published in November 2025 and put up for public debate by the Ministry of Education and Research, drew vehement reactions from teachers, writers, intellectuals, and researchers. The curriculum is criticized on the grounds that it "follows a linear and ethnocentric conception," fetishizes the past, and "favors the ideologization of literature with the aim of establishing a possible extremist regime." A memorandum with over 2,500 signatories, including intellectuals and personalities from the literary world, was submitted to the Ministry of Education and Research, calling for a complete rethinking of the curriculum.

In the fall of 2025, two unaffiliated senators, former POT members, submitted a bill that several NGOs and experts warned could be interpreted as limiting the right to abortion. The proposal was rejected in the Senate.

In November, the PSD officially amended its statute, removing the reference to it being a "progressive" party and defining itself ideologically closer to conservative "sovereignty," with references to the "democratic, national, religious, traditional, and cultural values of the Romanian people" and to a "mature economic patriotism."

Civil society is also increasingly polarized on issues related to abortion rights, LGBT rights, sex education, and reproductive health, with such ruptures along ideological lines manifesting themselves even within relevant NGOs.

International context – radical shift by traditional Western allies

The international context has played a favorable role in consolidating and legitimizing the far right, especially due to signals from some of Romania's traditional allies, particularly the US. Donald Trump's assumption of the presidency made the change of direction clear, with effects including on Europe and Romania. Among the first measures whose effects we also felt was the suspension of USAID programs and funds. The consequences were nowhere near as disastrous as on other continents, where the chances of survival have decreased, especially for the most vulnerable segments of society: children and women in poor countries dependent on humanitarian aid, where 14 million deaths are predicted over the next four years.

In Romania, according to a report by ActiveWatch, the drastic reduction in USAID funds has significantly amplified the often aggressive, anti-Semitic, anti-LGBT, illiberal conspiracy-theory rhetoric against Soros, which demonizes anything perceived, rightly or wrongly, as belonging to the ideological or political left. Lists of alleged enemies, "Sorosists," "traitors," and "parasites," usually identified among politicians, journalists, NGOs, intellectuals, or public figures, have begun to circulate again.

The influence of the American radical right was also felt in the Romanian Parliament in September when, at the request of the AUR, the majority of parliamentarians held a moment of silence for Charlie Kirk, the far-right activist and supporter of the MAGA movement who had been assassinated. The European Parliament rejected the request of the radical right in the EP to hold such a moment. Moreover, recent investigations show that the Tate brothers—symbols of the manosphere, promoters of far-right views—were released earlier this year through the intervention of the Trump administration.

In the context of the new presidential elections in May 2025, the internet has once again been flooded with anti-Semitic, anti-Roma racist, homophobic hate speech, as well as nationalist and even legionary rhetoric. Despite the regulations in force under the Digital Services Act (DSA), social networks have been far from coping with the wave of hatred. Towards the end of the year, the European Commission also noted a systematic failure to comply with the DSA regulations, fining platform X €120 million (and META and TikTok were also found to have irregularities that could lead to fines). The platform owned by Elon Musk – the richest man in the world – is also being investigated by French authorities for allegations of Holocaust denial through the AI chatbot Grok, a phenomenon we have seen this year exploited by far-right X accounts in Romania, which constantly disseminate virulent anti-Semitic, Holocaust-denying, and Legionnaire content, without any restraint from the X platform.

As a result of the fine, amounting to approximately 4.5% of annual revenue, Elon Musk and representatives of the Trump administration accused the EU of censorship, of "attacking all American technology platforms and the American people" (Secretary of State Marco Rubio), comparing the EU to Nazis and communists (Elon Musk) and thus claiming absolute freedom of expression, incompatible with the European regulations that platforms have committed to comply with through the DSA.

We can expect tensions between the EU and the US to escalate in the coming period, at least on this fault line between visions of the limits of freedom of expression, creating a kind of digital "cold war," potentially even legal and political. In early December, the US State Department instructed its staff to reject visa applications from people who have worked in areas such as fact-checking, content moderation, or other related areas that the Trump administration might perceive as "censorship."

It is therefore to be expected that we will see more American support for Romanian "sovereignists" in politics, alternative or mainstream media, influencers, or even far-right accounts such as the one from which Elon Musk himself reposted a xenophobic and false post, a neo-Legionary and pro-Kremlin account whose popularity was artificially inflated by armies of bots. In this context, it is no surprise that DSA regulations are not being enforced by platforms and are failing to limit online hate speech and disinformation, which are visibly flooding the largest social networks.

Current situation and recommendations

After the 2025 presidential elections, the AUR party rose steadily in the polls, reaching a score of around 40% of voters who would vote for it if new elections were held, followed at a considerable distance by the traditional parties – PSD (around 17%) and PNL (oscillating between 15-17%) . Thus, according to INSCOP data from September, the radical populist right-wing parties AUR-SOS-POT would be only 3% behind the parliamentary powerhouse PNL-PSD-USR-UDMR. However, the former recorded a decline at the end of November, with the hypothetical voting intention for AUR falling to 38%, back to the level of May, around the time of the elections, but rising to 40.9% in January 2026.

AUR remains more popular in rural areas, where almost half of voters would vote for it (49%), compared to 30% in urban areas. More Romanian men vote for AUR than women, especially those with primary and secondary education, predominantly in the age groups 30-44 and 45-59, i.e. the working population. Added to this are the unemployed, homemakers, people without occupation, and unpaid family workers who, in the 2024 presidential elections, voted predominantly for George Simion, as sociologist Cătălin Augustin Stoica (2025) pointed out.

On the other hand, Călin Georgescu was voted for mainly by young people aged 18-30 (pupils, students, and employees with secondary education), according to CURS data presented by Stoica, with the difference between urban and rural areas not being so great in the case of Georgescu's voters.

It follows that young people, on the one hand, and people from rural areas and those with a pre-university level of education, in situations of precariousness or socioeconomic vulnerability, on the other, are among those most likely to support far-right parties and candidates. This is an electorate that no longer finds social protection in the PSD and is turning to the AUR, with its empty promises of houses for €35,000 and campaigns in rural areas forgotten by other politicians.

We know from the FES study (2024) that young people are dissatisfied with the quality of education (and cutting their scholarships and stuffing them with chroniclers and old literature will not stimulate their love of school), we know that they spend most of their time on social media, that many of them work but feel economically insecure, are concerned about the state of the healthcare system, and are increasingly polarized on issues of the "culture war."

This data complements the overview of the evolution of the far right presented to guide a series of recommendations for combating this phenomenon. We list a few here, without claiming to be exhaustive.

In the absence of a comprehensive, systemic approach and effective measures, strategies to combat anti-Semitism, xenophobia, hatred, and radicalization risk remaining mere words on paper.

Recommendations:

• Radical revitalization of the electoral offer and political competition, through the reform of traditional parties and the emergence of new political actors who can reconnect with alienated segments of the electorate in rural and peripheral urban areas, as well as with young people, and who can directly address their specific socioeconomic problems and access to satisfactory public health and education services. Measures to reduce inequalities, distribute wealth more equitably, and improve social protection for the most vulnerable groups.
• Rejecting the messages typical of the radical right, nationalists, and conservatives, limiting political support for politicians with such views, refusing to collaborate with far-right parties or politicians, and consistently embracing democratic, inclusive values through the articulation of public policies, campaigns, and school programs.
• Reducing polarization, disinformation, and hate speech, including through strategic public communication, policies, funds, and programs for media education, critical thinking, strengthening anti-fascist and pro-democratic memory, intercultural dialogue, fact-checking, debunking (combating disinformation), and prebunking (preventing disinformation), especially in rural areas and for segments of the electorate exposed to radicalization.
• Prioritizing the limitation of hate speech and ensuring compliance with DSA regulations by online platforms (including with regard to access to data), applying proportionate sanctions, ensuring the necessary resources for institutions and organizations with such responsibilities. Improving inter-institutional cooperation and cooperation with relevant civil society organizations for the same purpose. Developing and supporting projects to monitor and moderate extremist content online. Stimulating and supporting research in this field, especially applied research, and improving access to data. Collaborations and exchanges of national and transnational best practices.
• Increasing trust in public institutions and government actors through accessible, transparent, and timely public communication, including on the reasons for canceling the 2024 elections. Depoliticizing and professionalizing leadership positions in key institutions.
• Ensuring democratic civilian control over the secret services, including by appointing a civilian director without nationalist-conservative leanings and from outside the political cartel, and professionalizing the parliamentary committee that should control the activities of the SRI. Decartelization of politics to eliminate the effects of this phenomenon on the justice system and intelligence services[6].
• More rigorous enforcement of existing provisions on combating neo-Legionism, hate speech, denialism, and the glorification of war criminals. Improving the collection and centralization of data on hate crimes (and their reporting), by different categories, but also on the progress of cases related to denialist, neo-Legionary, apologetic, and far-right manifestations. Continuous training on these issues for the police, the judiciary, and other relevant institutions.
• At the level of the Presidential Administration, the government, and the democratic political class: a firmer and more concrete condemnation of (neo)Legionary movements and the excesses of nationalism. Consultation with historians and experts with recognized expertise on topics related to the Holocaust, Legionaryism, and fascism to avoid possible revisionist blunders.
• At the level of the media: educating both their own journalists and the public about the dangers and manifestations of the extreme right, moderating hate speech on their own platforms, applying a critical filter when reporting statements by politicians or individuals with such views, avoiding Manichean, absolutist oversimplifications when dealing with complex socio-economic or cultural issues, without minimizing the danger of radical right-wing views.

Bibliography

Bădescu, Gabriel, et al. (coord.), România.Opinii, temeri și aspirații ale tinerilor într-o Românie a inegalităților sociale, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, București, 2024, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/bukarest/21471-20241212.pdf. 

Bărbulescu, Ana,  „Nichifor Crainic: neamul regal al acestui pământ și invazia paraziților”, în Florian, Alexandru și Bărbulescu, Ana, Elita culturală și discursul antisemit interbelic, Polirom, Iași, 2022, pp. 157-180.

Bărbulescu, Ana,  „Nae Ionescu: națiunea, Dumnezeu și evreii”, în Florian, Alexandru și Bărbulescu, Ana, Elita culturală și discursul antisemit interbelic, Polirom, Iași, 2022, pp. 131-156.

Dragolea, Alina (coord.), Monitorizarea alegerilor prezidențiale și parlamentare 2024/2025 din România O perspectivă intersecțională: gen, orientare sexuală și minorități, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, București, 2025, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/bukarest/22265.pdf. 

Florian, Alexandru, „Vintilă Horia între fascism și o posteritate cosmetizată”, în Florian, Alexandru și Bărbulescu, Ana, Elita culturală și discursul antisemit interbelic, Polirom, Iași, 2022, pp. 181-220.

Ghincea, Marius, „Economia politică a relațiilor civil-intelligence sub președinția Iohannis”, în Bâlici, Mihnea et al., Epoca Klaus Iohannis? România între 2014 și 2025, Tact, Cluj-Napoca, 2025, pp. 267-286.

INSHR-EW, Regimentul 89 în lupta cu iudeo-bolșevismul, 11 decembrie 2025, https://www.inshr-ew.ro/regimentul-89-in-lupta-cu-iudeo-bolsevismul/. 

Marincea, Adina, Țăranu, Ana, „Obiectele din oglindă sunt mai aproape decât par: Stop-cadru al dreptei radicale în deceniul Iohannis”, în Bâlici, Mihnea et al., Epoca Klaus Iohannis? România între 2014 și 2025, Tact, Cluj-Napoca, 2025, pp. 439-470.

Nastasă-Matei, Irina, „Ernest Bernea and the Legionary Movement: An Intellectual’s Ideological Choices and their Post-war Consequences”, Holocaust. Study & Research/Holocaust. Studii şi Cercetări (2020).

Stoica, Cătălin Augustin. Turul doi care n-a fost: Autopsia sumară a unui moment electoral (sperăm) unic, Humanitas, București, 2025.

[1] For a more comprehensive overview of the mainstreaming of the radical right and neo-Legionnaires in recent decades, see Marincea and Țăranu, 2025.

^[2] Intellectual and journalist close to the Legionary Movement, owner of the newspaper Cuvântul, main supporter of the Iron Guard – see Bărbulescu, 2022.

^[3] Ernest Bernea was a student of Nae Ionescu and a member and ideologue of the Legionary Movement, part of the fascist faction of the Gustian School. Researcher Irina Nastasă-Matei (2020) shows that, similar to other former Legionnaires, he later collaborated with the National Communist regime, which appropriated some of the Legionnaires' nationalist-protocronist ideas for its own agenda.

^[4] Nichifor Crainic was director and contributor to several far-right and pro-Legionary newspapers, including Gândirea, Calendarul, Sfarmă-Piatră, Cuvântul, Neamul Românesc, etc. He was Minister of National Propaganda in the National Legionary State (1940) and director of the National Radio Company in the Antonescu Government (1941) – see Bărbulescu, 2022.

^[5] Vintilă Horia was one of the ideologues of Romanian fascism and held an official position during Ion Antonescu's rule, during the Holocaust, more precisely as press attaché at the consulate in Vienna controlled by the Nazi regime – see Florian, 2022.

[6] Răzvan Petri, Vlad Adamescu, and Marius Ghincea have written about the phenomenon of political cartelization through the monopolization of power and resources by the PSD-PNL-UDMR. Ghincea (2025) points out that the SRI has set itself up as the protector and beneficiary of this cartel, thus profoundly corrupting the civil-intelligence relationship. Petri (2025) proposes the following measures to improve democratic control over the SRI and SIE: "professionalizing parliamentarians in control committees, creating a position of inspector general within the services, and legislative changes that would cut off the services' access to the market through front companies."

A similar pyramidal structure that would have cartelized power in the hands of a small group of magistrates with political connections was recently revealed by the documentary Recorder, "Justiția capturată" (Captured Justice).

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES).

About the author:

Adina Marincea is a researcher at the Elie Wiesel National Institute for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania, where she analyzes far-right discourse and manifestations in Romania. She holds a PhD in Communication and Public Relations and a postdoctorate on the populist discourse of the radical right in Romania.